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1 Introduction
Telecommunications markets are undergoing important changes as operators up-
grade their access networks rolling out fiber instead of copper cables. Next Genera-
tion Access Networks (NGA) are essential to increase upload and download speed.
This is key to encourage the development of new services for residential customers
and businesses alike. The benefits for society and the private benefits for investors
are, however, highly uncertain. Still, governments view the roll-out of high-speed
connections as an important factor of competitiveness. High-speed connections
come in various types: fiber to the home (FTTH), fiber to the building (FTTB),
fiber to the premises (FTTP), and fiber to the cabinet (FTTC). While they diﬀer
by speed and investment cost, the economic issues involved are very similar.
After an investment has taken place, NGA infrastructure becomes an essen-
tial facility if duplication is not profitable. However, given high costs and uncer-
tainty, even investment by only one network operator cannot be taken for granted.
Whether investment incentives are appropriate depends on competition and on the
type of contractual solution that networks use when granting or seeking access.
The aim of this paper is to shed more light on the precise role of the (possibly
regulated) form of access contracts, together with competition, to generate invest-
ment incentives and benefits for consumers. In terms of regulation, our focus is
on the regulation of the form and timing of such contractual solutions to share
investment costs and to grant access, rather than on the regulation of the detailed
clauses such as the access price. This allows, in particular, for market forces and
bargaining power to determine these clauses. While this approach is currently not
widely followed and we also discuss various cost-related access rules, regulation
that focuses on the type of permissible contracts rather than the levels of access
prices leaves more room for the market to determine access conditions and thus
appears to be less intrusive. The main goal of this paper is to analyze investment
incentives under alternative contracting regimes and market environments. In par-
ticular, we determine critical levels of investment costs above which investment in
NGA is undertaken. We compare these critical levels across diﬀerent contractual
regimes.
Another issue is whether access terms can be used as a means to partially or
even fully foreclose competitors. Based on our formal analysis, it appears that this
concern should not be ignored, but that in diﬀerentiated product markets the in-
centive to foreclose competitors is limited. Instead of foreclosure, the problem may
rather be that access contracts relax competition to the detriment of consumers.
Yet another issue that has been discussed in the policy arena are co-investments
between operators. We refer to them as ex-ante contracts which are signed by
parties before the investment is undertaken. One concern of those contracts is
that they may impede eﬀective competition in the market place. As we will argue,
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such a concern may be warranted. However, without further elaborating on this,
ex-post interventions by regulators or antitrust authorities may reduce any risks
of anticompetitive behavior.
We base our analysis on properties of equilibrium profits, which are satisfied
by a standard "workhorse" model of Hotelling competition, albeit enriched by an
extension that allows to capture diﬀerent degrees of industry demand elasticity
(see Section 3). We assume that both network providers have access to an "old"
(copper) technology on equal terms. This holds either if both network providers
own their own access network or if one obtains (regulated) access at marginal
costs.1 In this setting, we first derive, absent access contracts, some key insights
on investment incentives and on how these interact with competition in the market
(see Section 4). Subsequently, we allow for access contracts. Here, we first analyze
ex-post contracts, which are contracts concluded only after the initial investment
was made by one firm (Section 5). These are subsequently compared to ex-ante
contracts in Section 6, which are signed before the investment decision is taken
by at least one firm. These contracts can include co-investment agreements. Both
ex-post and ex-ante access contracts can be used to dampen competition in the
market for the new technology. We show how, depending on bargaining power,
contracts may resolve diﬀerently a hold-up problem, on the one hand, and a pos-
sible foreclosure problem, on the other hand. Based on these results we can then
compare ex-ante and ex-post contracts in terms of investment incentives. Access
regulation is introduced in Section 7. We analyze how various forms of regulation
impact on investment incentives and on competition. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In our analysis we consider the interplay of competition, access contracts, and
investment incentives. It appears that the link between access regulation and
competition in downstream markets is not suﬃciently considered in public dis-
cussions. However, we are not the first to have looked into this subject. In the
following, we oﬀer a brief, selective summary of the existing literature.
A significant literature on investment incentives started with Arrow (1962).2
Several papers examine unbundled network access. Examples include Gual and
Seabright (2000), a paper commissioned by the DGCOMP of the European Com-
mission, and de Bijl and Peitz (2005), which outlines the economic issues of un-
bundling network access and the main regulatory challenges. A number of papers
1While interesting, it is beyond the scope of this paper to allow for asymmetries that arise
from regulation of the old technology. For an analysis of asymmetries under the old technology
see Bourreau, Cambini, and Dogan (2011) and Inderst and Peitz (2011a).
2For a discussion of this literature, see Belleflamme and Peitz (2010).
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on one-way access focus on the optimal Ramsey-price setting of a regulator in
an environment characterized by homogeneous services in the downstream mar-
kets. Other papers consider markets with a “competitive fringe”–i.e., a market in
which there exists a horizontally or vertically diﬀerentiated incumbent and many
small competitors, all of which oﬀer perfectly substitutable services to each other.
In earlier literature, authors have also considered the regulation of access fees for
the case of given retail prices. In this context, it is worth mentioning the eﬃcient
component pricing rule (ECPR), thoroughly discussed in Armstrong (2002), as
well as in Laﬀont and Tirole (2000) and Vogelsang (2003). A growing number of
papers, as we do, focus on network access under imperfect competition. We will
discuss some of these papers next.
Laﬀont and Tirole (1994) focus on the regulator’s problem in a Ramsey-price
setting for the case of imperfect competition in the downstream market. Arm-
strong and Vickers (1998) consider an asymmetric market in which one of the two
firms is more eﬃcient. They show that regulators increase welfare by changing the
terms of access in favor of the more eﬃcient firm. The reason is that, otherwise,
this more eﬃcient firm will attain an insuﬃcient market share from a social per-
spective; see also, Lewis and Sappington (1999). De Bijl and Peitz (2006) show
that the eﬀects of market regulation depend on whether the market is completely
or partially covered–i.e., whether or not market demand is price-elastic. We have
also examined this aspect in detail in this paper.
A significant part of the related literature comprises short-term analyses in
which investments are considered already given. Valletti (2003) discusses in-
vestment incentives without explicitly modelling them. Guthrie (2006) provides
an overview of the relevant literature, which establishes a connection between
infrastructure investments and various regulatory regimes. Cambini and Jiang
(2009) survey the theoretical and empirical research in the area of telecommuni-
cations, which examine connection between access, investments, and regulation.
Theoretical research papers that focus on unilateral network access and invest-
ment incentives include Foros (2004), Kotakorpi (2006), Vareda (2009a, 2009b),
Klumpp and Su (2010), Brito, Pereira, and Vareda (2010), Nitsche and Wiethaus
(2011), Bourreau, Cambini, and Dogan (2011), and Inderst and Peitz (2011a).
What these papers have in common is their study of the incumbent’s incentives to
improve the quality of its access network. Gans and Williams (1999), Gans (2001),
Gans and King (2004), Hori and Mizuno (2006, 2009), and Vareda and Hoernig
(2010) investigate the incentives in a race to build up a new access network. For
the sake of brevity we provide some additional remarks on a few of these works.
Foros (2004) considers regulation as means to induce eﬃcient investment in-
centives for a vertically integrated firm (typically the incumbent) and, at the same
time, to prevent foreclosure to emerge. In a dynamic model with unregulated
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access, Bourreau and Dogan (2005) look at the eﬀects of charges for unbundled
network access on the incentives of the access-seeking firm to invest in an alter-
native network. Due to dynamic incentives, the incumbent grants free access to
the market in order to postpone the setup of a competing network. Furthermore,
the paper supports the idea that the incumbent may have no incentive to invest in
the quality of its services. This result, however, only holds in a very unique model
setting.3
Vareda (2009b) considers the interaction in a regulated market between the
investments of an incumbent to increase the quality of its current network and the
setup of an alternative NGA by a competitor. Vareda and Hoernig (2010) focus on
investment competition between two firms, in which they allow for investment to
bypass the access network. They show that two-part tariﬀs do not always suﬃce to
obtain eﬃcient investments in a first-best sense because the fixed part of the two-
part tariﬀ is supposed to fulfil two tasks: to optimize the timing of the investment
of the first as well as of the second firm.
Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) provide a detailed comparison of various regu-
latory instruments in a linear-quadratic model. In particular, they evaluate the
instrument of regulatory holidays. Here, the authors assume that the investing
firm does not grant access and, thus, there is complete foreclosure of the market.
In their fully specified model they obtain a complete ranking of various regulatory
instruments. However, it is questionable how robust their ranking is in a more
general setting. While, to fix ideas, we also provide a fully specified model, we fo-
cus on robust implications and, thus, do not attempt to provide a welfare ranking
of diﬀerent contractual regimes.
Lastly, Bourreau, Cambini, and Dogan (2011) and Inderst and Peitz (2011a)
focus on the role of initial asymmetries in the migration to NGAs. The former
contribution provides a rich analysis of investment decisions in a continuum of
markets, the latter is based on the present contribution to explore the impor-
tance of regulation-induced asymmetries in the market with the old technology
on investment decisions in the new technology. Related to our Section 6, Bour-
reau, Cambini, and Hoernig (2011) provide a detailed analysis of co-investments
in NGA.
3 The Duopoly Model
To fix ideas, we consider an extended Hotelling model with a hinterland for each
firm. Our main insights are based on reduced-form profit functions and thus
apply more generally. There are two network operators, firm 1 and firm 2 and
3On this topic, also see Pindyck (2007), as well as the discussion in De Bijl and Peitz (2002).
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a continuum of consumers. Captive consumers of firm  are located in firm ’s
hinterland, and non-captive consumers are located on the Hotelling line.4
Firms and non-captive customers are located on the interval [0 1]. Each non-
captive consumer is represented through a location:  ∈ [0 1]. More specifically,
we assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on this interval, which gives
rise to linear demand in the competitive segment of the market.5 Also, we assume
that the products of the two firms are located at the extreme points of the interval,
0 and 1. A consumer who is located at point , has "transportation cost"  when
he purchases the product from firm 1 vs. (1 − ) when he purchases from firm
2. The parameter  measures the level of horizontal diﬀerentiation and, thus, the
degree of competition between the two oﬀerings. We denote with  the gross
utility of a consumer from the ideal service of firm . The net benefit before
deducting the purchasing price is 1 −  when she purchases the product from
firm 1 and 2− (1− ) when she acquires the product from firm 2.
We assume that the mass of consumers  is situated on the [0 1]-interval. In
addition to this consumer segment, each firm has a “hinterland” with mass  of
consumers, which it serves exclusively. This category of consumers is comprised of
particularly loyal consumers with either high transition costs or strong preferences
for a particular product. We assume that the hinterland is suﬃciently unattrac-
tive and firm asymmetries are not too pronounced such that both firms have an
incentive to serve the competitive segment of consumers.
Each firm sets the price , which is valid for all consumers. A consumer of
type  has net utility of 1− − 1 when she consumes firm 1’s product and net
utility of 2 − (1 − ) − 2 when she consumes firm 2’s product. Firm  incurs
costs of  per consumer it serves. We turn to possible investments in the following
section.
3.1 Competition and Equilibrium
Within the competitive segment, there is a consumer type b who is indiﬀerent
between the service oﬀered by the two firms, 2 − 2 − (1 − b) = 1 − 1 − b .
Then b(1 2) = 1
2
+
1
2 [(1 − 1)− (2 − 2)] .
4If a firm has captive customers this firm is essential to provide services to this group of
customers. The larger the number of captive customers of this firm, the less likely that foreclosure
of that firm is an issue.
5The assumption of a uniform distribution is made for computational convenience. Our results
can be extended to other well-behaved customer distributions.
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All consumers located to the left of b will buy product 1, while all consumers
located to the right of b will purchase product 2. The demand of each firm is
1 = 1 +b and 1 = 2 +(1− b)
Hence, before subtracting fixed costs, firm 1’s profit is
1 = (1 +b) (1 − 1) 
Analogously, firm 2’s profit is:
2 = (2 +(1− b)) (2 − 2) 
It proves useful to define the following parameters: b1 = 1 and b2 = 2 .
Hence,
1 = (b1 + b) (1 − 1) and 2 = (b2 + (1− b)) (2 − 2) 
Thus, the factor  scales the size of the (regional) markets.
Each firm sets its price so that, given its competitor’s price, its profit is max-
imized. A necessary condition for profit maximization is that the marginal profit
is zero. As derived in Appendix 1, equilibrium profits can be expressed as,
∗1 =  12
µ
1
3
(1 − 2) + 1
3
(2 − 1) + 2b2
3(1) +
4b1
3(1) + 
¶2

∗2 =  12
µ
1
3
(2 − 1) + 1
3
(1 − 2) + 2b1
3(1) +
4b2
3(1) + 
¶2

In Appendix 1 we report further variables of interest, in particular, equilibrium
prices and welfare.
3.2 Price-Dependent Industry Demand
In our previous analysis, a central assumption was that industry demand was price-
independent. We now suppose that demand in both monopoly segments is price-
dependent–i.e., 1(1) is decreasing in 1 when positive and 2(2) is decreasing
in 2 when positive. In particular, set () = max{0 ( +  − )}. Then,
firm 1’s demand is
1 =
∙
1
2
+
1
2 [(1 − 1)− (2 − 2)] + 1(1 + 1 − 11)
¸

Appendix 2 reports equilibrium prices when hinterlands are symmetric.
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4 Investment Incentives in the Absence of Con-
tracts
4.1 Initial Observations
Technologies Investments can both reduce costs and increase customer valua-
tion. Within the NGA context investments that increase the product’s valuation
appear to be particularly relevant. Therefore, we suppose that a firm’s investment
volume  positively aﬀects a customer’s valuation .
We consider a 0-1 investment decision in the build-up of an NGA access net-
work. This appears to be the relevant case if markets are regionally segmented–
i.e., a firm decides whether or not it will invest in a new technology in a particular
region and that this is unaﬀected by its decisions in other regions.6
We further assume that a firm that does not invest, uses the old technology.7
A firm , which has not invested, is characterized by  =  and  =  (the
“old technology”). An investment amounting to  generates a more attractive
oﬀer  =    (the “new technology”), e.g., through faster uploads and
downloads. Moreover, the cost per participant can also change, from  to  ,
which could be higher or lower.
Investment Incentives We can write profits as a function of whether firms 1
and 2 have invested: ∗1(1 2) and ∗2(1 2), where we set  = 1 when firm  has
made an investment and  = 0 when it has not. In the case of price-independent
industry demand, explicit expressions for these profits have been derived in the
previous section.
If the other firm does not invest, such an investment is profitable when the
change in profits after deduction of investments costs is positive. That is,
 ≤ ∗ ≡ ∗ (1 0)− ∗ (0 0)
If the other firm also invests, the investment is profitable if
 ≤ ∗∗ ≡ ∗ (1 1)− ∗ (0 1)
This condition is stricter than the previous one–i.e., ∗∗  ∗ . Profit growth
is smaller if the competitor is expected to invest also.
6Thus, we do not need to consider coverage decisions. If an operator had to set a uniform
price across regions our analysis would need to be modified. We refer to Bourreau, Cambini and
Dogan (2011) for an analysis where firms price-discriminate between regions.
7As noted in the introduction, if one firm requires access to the old technology and the other
firm upgrades its network, the access option for the old technology may no longer be available.
We refer to Inderst and Peitz (2011a) for an analysis of such a situation.
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If 1 = 2 (so that ∗1 = ∗2 ≡ ∗ and ∗∗1 = ∗∗2 ≡ ∗∗), we distinguish between
three regimes:8
1.  ≤ ∗∗: The necessary volume of investment is so small that both firms have
an incentive to invest, irrespective of the competitor’s investment decision.
2. ∗∗   ≤ ∗: The investment pays oﬀ only if the competitor does not invest.
3.   ∗: The necessary volume of investment is so high that no firm has an
incentive to invest, irrespective of the competitor’s investment decision.
In the first case, in subgame-perfect equilibrium of the investment-then-pricing
game both firms invest at the first stage. In this case, it is possible that ∗ (1 1)−  ∗ (0 0). This corresponds to the prisoner’s dilemma problem: If both firms
could write binding contracts, they would agree not to undertake their investments.
But since they cannot cooperate when taking this decision, they both invest and
attain lower profits than in the initial situation. If we allow for asymmetries
between firms, from the general considerations about investment incentives, we
conclude that the firm with the higher initial market share has higher incentives
to invest, and, thus, that the thresholds (∗ and ∗∗ ) are smaller than those of its
competitor.
Welfare Duplicating investments has several eﬀects. First, fixed costs will be
duplicated. As long as the firm that has invested does not grant its competi-
tor access to the network, duplication is the only way to provide higher-quality
services to those consumers who are served by the competitor. An investment
by one firm increases its returns given the investment decision of the other firm.
Second, investment decisions influence competition in the market: Competition is
asymmetric when just one firm invested, while it is symmetric when both firms
invested. Third, with price-dependent industry demand, a firm’s investment af-
fects the deadweight loss of the corresponding hinterland (where the size of the
deadweight loss depends on the prices that are set in equilibrium).
Let us consider the social desirability of investment duplication. For the sake
of simplicity, we address this issue only for the special case that there are no
hinterlands–i.e., 1 = 2 = 0. We use the following notation: b(1 0) denotes the
8For the purpose of this analysis, we abstract from mixed-strategy equilibria, which could
be interpreted as arising from a coordination failure. This may be justified also on the following
grounds: Planning and implementation of investment should extend over a longer period of time.
Then a coordination failure seems less plausible, even though this is modelled in the game as
a one-oﬀ decision. (Furthermore, if one instead assumes that firms decide whether to invest
in an exogenous sequence, there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium: It never happens in a
subgame-perfect equilibrium that the second mover invests if the first mover has not invested.)
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indiﬀerent consumer if firm 1 invests and firm 2 does not. Analogously, we defineb(0 0), b(0 1), and b(1 1). We denote total surplus depending on the number of
firms which have invested, , by  (). If just firm 1 invests, welfare is
 (1) = £b(1 0)( − ) + (1− b(0 1))( − )−  (b(0 1))¤− .
If both firms invest, welfare is
 (2) = £( − )−  (b(1 1))¤− 2.
To see whether the market can feature socially excessive investment duplica-
tion, we evaluate welfare at the critical investment threshold ∗∗. If  (1)   (2)
holds at ∗∗, it would be more eﬃcient to suppress the investment of the second
firm. Without loss of generality, set the market size equal to  = 1. From the
previous analysis, it follows that b(1 1) = 12 and b(1 0) = 12 +∆(6), where
∆ ≡ ( − )− ( − ) is the cost-adjusted diﬀerence in utilities between the
new and the old technology. Thus both firms remain active if b(1 0)  1 which is
equivalent to   ∆3. The critical investment volume is ∗∗ = ∆2(18)−∆6.
Hence, the diﬀerence in welfare, evaluated at this level, is
 (2)− (1) = (1− b(1 0))∆+  (b(1 0))−  (b(1 1))− ∗∗
=
µ
1
2
− 1
6∆
¶
∆+
Ã

2
µ
1
2
+
1
6∆
¶2
+

2
µ
1
2
+
1
6∆
¶2!
− 
4
−
µ
1
18∆
2 − 1
6
∆
¶
=
2
3
∆− 7
36
∆2
  0
for   ∆3. We observe that for any admissible value  , the expression is positive.
Thus, in this simple specification, investment duplication is never socially excessive
if network access is not feasible or prohibited by the regulator.
5 Investment under Ex-Post Contracts
5.1 Price-Independent Industry Demand
Linear Access Contracts In this section, we consider contracts that grant the
competitor access to the constructed network and that are concluded after the
investment. Before considering more complex contracts, we first consider linear
contracts–i.e., the competitor receives access to NGA and pays an access sur-
charge per customer. For the moment, we further assume that the investing firm
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holds all the bargaining power. Specifically, we consider the case in which firm 1
has made an investment while firm 2 has not, and the latter decides whether to
take the oﬀer to gain access through paying an access fee  per customer.
Decisions are taken as follows: After firm 1 has invested, but firm 2 has not,
firm 1 oﬀers a contract  that specifies the price for which firm 2 can get access for
each of its additional customers. Subsequently, both firms set their prices. Profit
functions are
1(1 2;) = (1 − )(b(1 2) +1) + ( − )( +1 +2)
2(1 2;) = (2 − )((1− b(1 2)) +2)
An important result is that because industry demand is price-independent (the
number of customers is always  + 1 + 2), the level of  does not impact
equilibrium profits of firm 2.9 Thus, in the standard model, the specific design of
the linear contract is irrelevant for firm 2 (as shown in de Bijl and Peitz, 2006). This
insight is now discussed in detail. An increase of  by∆ results in a price increase
for both firm 1 and firm 2. In this model, the firm with granted access passes on
the entire increased costs of access to consumers. The firm granting access also
increases its price, although its costs  remain unchanged. The reason for this
is that its opportunity costs have also increased by ∆ as each lost customer
generates additional profit of ∆ in the access market. The economic costs for
both firms have therefore increased by ∆
In comparison to a market without contracts, we observe that firm 1 has in-
creased its profits compared to ∗(1 0). In the model with access, profits of the
access-seeking firm are equal to ∗(1 1). However, it does not need to make in-
vestments itself. Therefore, firm 2 will always prefer not to invest itself, but to use
the access network of its competitor. This holds true despite firm 1 having full
control over the price of access.
If we now consider investments at the upstream stage and, for simplicity, as-
sume sequential investments, there does not exist an equilibrium in which firm
2 also invests - i.e., there is no duplication of the access network. We now have
a new critical value ∗ , below which firm 1 decides to invest. If  exceeds this
threshold, there is no investment at all. The critical value ∗ is greater than∗. This is true because the access-granting firm can extract rents amounting to
( +1 +2)( − ) when  was chosen optimally ensuring that the market is
still fully covered. Figure 1 below illustrates these findings.
9More precisely, this holds until an upper bound, above which some customers are no longer
active. Thus, firm 1’s maximization problem must satisfy the condition that, when setting ,
this upper bound is not exceeded.
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More Complex Access Contracts Up to this point, we have only considered
linear contracts, implying that the access-seeking firm pays the same price per
user. In principle, this does not have to be true. For example, a contract can
comprise the payment of a fixed fee together with a smaller additional variable
fee. This way, the firm granting access to the network can achieve further rent
extraction. In our case, in which the firm granting access has full bargaining
power, it can even extract the entire rent and therefore lower the profit of the
access seeking firm to the level without access: ∗(0 1). In more concrete terms,
this means that the contract then includes an additional fixed user fee amounting
to  = ∗(1 1)− ∗(0 1).
This has now repercussions on incentives to invest. The case in which none
of the firms invests becomes less likely: The corresponding threshold under non-
linear contracts, ∗, lies strictly above the previous threshold: ∗  ∗ ∗. On the other hand, there now exists an interval in which both firms invest:
 ≤ ∗∗. As in the current case, where the access-granting firm has the entire
bargaining power, the non-investing firm stays at the same profit level of ∗(0 1),
this threshold is the same as without contracts: ∗∗ = ∗∗.
Bargaining Power As long as we consider only linear contracts, the distribution
of bargaining power plays no role. Both firms are strictly better oﬀ if  is chosen as
to reach the monopoly outcome.10 The distribution of bargaining power, however,
plays a very important role under more complex contract schemes.
Complex contracts allow us to analyze two objectives of contracts separately
and without any conflicts. The first is to maximize aggregate industry profits.
Within the current framework, this is achieved by choosing  high enough to
attain the monopoly outcome. The second objective is to divide the resulting
profits according to the corresponding bargaining power of both parties. Both
objectives can already be reached with a two-part tariﬀ (). Then shifts in
bargaining power have no eﬀect on the market outcome given investments, but only
for the distribution of rents between both firms. This, however, has repercussions
on incentives to invest. If the access-seeking firm has bargaining power, thresholds
for investment shift as follows. If only one firm invests, the new threshold ∗ 
will lie below the previous threshold ∗ due to the emerging hold-up problems
(which occurs because the non-investing firm can now retain some rents).11 On the
other hand, the probability of a duplication of investments again decreases: ∗∗ 
lies below ∗∗. It also holds that 0 = ∗∗  ∗∗   ∗∗ and ∗  ∗  ∗,
as well as ∗  ∗   ∗. In general, it is not clear whether ∗  ∗  as, in
10Furthermore, this holds under the assumption that it is always optimal to reach full coverage
of the entire market.
11For a seminal formal analysis of the hold-up problem, we refer to Grossman and Hart (1986).
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extreme cases, the non-investing firm can push down profits of the investing firm to
∗(1 0). Fig. 1 sums up the equilibrium investment decisions in all four scenarios.
A stronger bargaining position of firm 2 leads to less duplication of investments
because firm 2 can alternatively enforce a more attractive contract for itself.
 insert Fig 1 around here 
5.2 Price-Dependent Industry Demand and Access Charges
Linear Access Contracts Our previous analysis essentially depended on the as-
sumption that industry demand is price-independent. In the following, we analyze
price-dependent demands in the monopoly segments–i.e., 1(1) is decreasing in
1 and 2(2) is decreasing in 2. The special case with constant 1 = 0 and
linear contracting was investigated by de Bijl and Peitz (2006).
The profit function of firm 1 is now
1 = (1 − )(b(1 2) +1(1)) + ( − )((1− b(1 2)) +2(2))
= (1 − )(b(1 2) +1(1)) + ( − )( +1(1) +2(2)) (1)
The profit function of firm 2 is
2 = (2 − )((1− b(1 2)) +2(2))
Both equilibrium prices ∗1 and ∗2 depend on . In contrast to the basic
model with price-independent industry demand, in this framework, it holds that
∗2  1, since an increase in price will lead to reduced demand in the monopoly
segment. This implies that a higher NGA access fee induces lower profits for
the access-seeking firm. Correspondingly, firm 1 will adjust its price such that
∗1  1 holds despite its increased opportunity costs.
However, with price-dependent industry demand we now have the following
important asymmetry between the two firms: Firm 1 has an opportunity cost
of  when selling to additional consumers in its monopoly segment. Firm 2,
however, incurs the cost for access    in its own monopoly segment. In
equilibrium, firm 1 will now tend to set a lower price as its opportunity costs are
lower compared to its competitor. As a consequence, we will have partial market
foreclosure: A higher access price  will lead to asymmetric market outcomes
resulting in decreasing market share of the access-seeking firm.
The basic model with price-independent industry demand is of key importance,
as it shows that in case of asymmetric investments the investing firm has no incen-
tives to foreclose the market. Therefore, we should not always suspect that there
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exist incentives for a complete or partial market foreclosure. With price-dependent
industry demand, however, the access-granting firm secures a higher market share.
Eﬀectively, it raises the rival’s costs reducing the rival’s market share, and this may
be labelled as partial foreclosure. As a result, duplication of investments can oc-
cur even in case of linear contracting. At least in the game we consider, in which
the access-granting firm holds all the bargaining power, the other firm, even with
linear contracts, turns out to be strictly worse oﬀ compared to the a situation in
which it had invested itself from the beginning (abstracting from fixed investment
costs).
More Complex Access Contracts and Bargaining Power In the case
of price-dependent industry demand, more complex contracts are also useful to
achieve a generally more eﬃcient outcome. In order to illustrate this, we again
consider the case in which the access-granting firm has full bargaining power and
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer.
From above we know that with price-independent industry demand, a linear
access tariﬀ  grants the access-seeking firm profit ∗(1 1), which exceeds ∗(0 1).
Qualitatively, the same result holds with price-dependent industry demand. Of
central importance is the following observation: As previously mentioned, with a
linear access fee, the fee  determines both the size of the industry profits and their
distribution. In the case of price-dependent demand, given the optimal choice of
 of the access-granting firm, we obtain equilibrium prices that may diﬀer from
those chosen by an integrated monopolist. Even in a symmetric baseline scenario
the price set by the access-seeking firm is higher and its market share smaller,
especially compared to the monopoly outcome. If, however, the access-granting
firm can also set a fixed fee  , it will charge a smaller unit price  in order to
extract a higher rent with the fixed fee. In a nutshell: With a complex access
contract double marginalization may be prevented.
This result remains valid even if bargaining power is diﬀerently distributed.
If the contract is suﬃciently complex, the (marginal) unit price  and the final
customer price are independent of the distribution of bargaining power, which just
causes a shift of rents between the firms. The situation is diﬀerent in case of
linear tariﬀs. There, given that industry demand is price-dependent, an increase
in the bargaining power of the access-seeking firm will lead to a reduction in 
and, hence, to lower prices for both firms as well as a higher market share for the
access-seeking firm.
Our discussion should, however, not hide the fact that complex access contracts
can be to the detriment of consumers. To see this, first recall that the two-part tar-
iﬀ () does not achieve the monopoly outcome. Let us, instead, consider a more
general contract that links payments of the access-seeking firm to the sales volume
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of both firms. As an example under symmetry, consider the following simple tar-
iﬀ system implementing the monopoly outcome given an arbitrary distribution of
bargaining power. First, the access-seeking firm makes a fixed payment  to the
access-granting firm. Second, assume that after the realization of quantities a fixed
fraction of the lump-sum payment, , is divided between the two firms propor-
tionally to their quantities such that the split is 1(1 + 2) and 2(1 + 2),
respectively. By choosing  appropriately, we can now steer the marginal costs of
both firms in such a way that the monopoly outcome is obtained. The fixed fee
 can then be used to generate an asymmetric rent distribution between the two
firms.
5.3 Summary: Ex-Post Contracts
Let us compare the case with ex-post contracts with the one in which firms could
not conclude contracts. The following results follow from the above analysis:
Result 1. With (ex-post-) contracts, at least one of the firms invests more often
than without contracts. This holds even more if the bargaining power lies
with the access-granting firm and if complex access contracts can be used.
Result 2. With (ex-post-) contracts, situations in which both firms invest (du-
plication of investments) are less frequent. This is less often the case if the
access-seeking firm has a much bargaining power. Complex contracts are
more likely to lead to duplication, especially if bargaining power resides with
the access-granting firm.
Customers benefit from duplication of investments since then competition is
more intense. If only one firm invests, all customers can still access the new
technology if such access is granted. On the other hand, such an access contract can
be used to dampen competition, so that customers could theoretically be worse oﬀ
compared to a situation in which none of the firms invested but price competition
remained intact. A reduction of competition may, however, be sometimes necessary
as, otherwise, an investment may not be profitable. A key element in the overall
assessment of ex-post contracts is thus the question whether some reduction in
the degree of competition, either through avoiding duplication of investments or
through a dampening of competition by contractual means, must be tolerated to
maximize social and consumer surplus.
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6 Investment under Ex-Ante Contracts
6.1 Bargaining and Ex-Ante Contracts
We now consider the possibility that both firms can agree upon long-term contracts
for the joint use of a new technology before the actual investment is made. These
contracts can be seen as co-investment contracts.
Let us first focus on the phase of negotiation. We do not model the bargaining
process itself, but postulate that bargaining is eﬃcient (according to the view of the
two firms involved) and that the symmetric Nash bargaining solution is achieved,
i.e., that the gains relative to the outside options are equally split.12 To determine
the outcome of these negotiations, we first have to determine the consequences
if ex-ante negotiations are unsuccessful. In particular, what are the equilibrium
profits firms would achieve in case ex-ante negotiations break down? These profits
constitute the outside options of the two firms. Let us denote these outside options
by 1 and 2 (here,  stands for “breakdown”–i.e., failure of negotiations).
In order to have a unique prediction assume for simplicity that one of the firms,
say  = 1, decides at first whether it wants to invest (This is consistent with
a modified model of sequential investment). For this situation, we have already
characterized the equilibrium with the threshold values ∗ and ∗∗ in the case
without contracts. Now suppose for the moment that ex-post contracting is not
feasible. Then, if ∗   and profits are symmetric, it holds that  = ∗(0 0)
since neither of the firms invests in case of a failure of ex-ante negotiations. If
∗∗    ∗ so that exactly one firm invests in a situation without contracts,
it follows that 1 = ∗(1 0) −  and 2 = ∗(0 1). If   ∗∗ so that both
firms invest in a situation without contracts, it follows that 1 = ∗(1 1) − 
and 2 = ∗(1 1)− .
What happens to ex-post contracting in case of a failure of ex-ante negotia-
tions? Depending on the choice of a particular ex-post contract, the above thresh-
olds are adjusted accordingly–for example, to thresholds ∗ and ∗∗ in the
case of non-linear ex-post access contracts.
We assume that contracts are flexible enough so as to allow a separation of
rent distribution and industry profit maximization. As an example, if we consider
two-part tariﬀs (), the per-consumer wholesale payment  will be chosen inde-
12Ex-ante and ex-post contracts diﬀer with respect to the point in time they are signed, before
or after the investment. This implies that, under ex-post contracting, the investment generates
an asymmetry between firms. An extreme assumption, which was the starting point of our
analysis in the previous section, is that the access-granting firm has all the bargaining power.
By contrast, under ex-ante contracting it is endogenous which of the firms will carry out the
investment. Thus, the Nash bargaining solution appears to be the natural starting point of the
analysis under ex-ante contracting.
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pendent of the distribution of bargaining power in order to maximize total industry
profits. The fixed payment  is used to divide the rent among the two firms. De-
note the industry profits attainable under the optimal access contract (i.e. only
one firm invests) by Π (gross of investment costs). It follows that the "net
surplus" generated by the investment of a firm equals
 = (Π − )− (1 + 2 )
If ∗∗    ∗, this becomes
 = (Π − )− [∗(1 0) + ∗(0 1)− ]
= Π − [∗(1 0) + ∗(0 1)]
If   0 and firms have the same bargaining power, the value of the fixed
payment  is determined so that each firm has an equal share of net surplus .
Firm 1 would receive, for example, 1 +2. For the case when ∗∗    ∗,
firm 1 would realize a profit of
[∗(1 0)− ] + 1
2
£Π − ∗(1 0)− ∗(0 1)¤ 
For firm 2, we end up with a profit of 2 +2 , respectively, or, explicitly for
the case ∗∗    ∗:
∗(0 1) + 1
2
£Π − ∗(1 0)− ∗(0 1)¤ 
6.2 Investments
It is important to understand the implications of ex-ante contracts on the will-
ingness of firms to invest in comparison to an environment in which only ex-post
contracting is allowed or feasible. In case of price-independent industry demand it
always follows–and is, therefore, independent of the available access contracts–
that duplication of investments does not occur: ∗∗ = 0 with ex-ante-contracts.
However, we may still have duplication of investment with price-elastic industry
demand under ex-ante contracting, provided that these access contracts cannot be
suﬃciently flexibly designed.
At the same time, ex-ante contracts mitigate the hold-up problem or in the
case of suﬃciently complex contracts even allow to avoid it completely.13 For this
reason, the threshold ∗ lies above the corresponding threshold that would apply
13As a reminder: The hold-up problem arises when the single investing firm cannot extract the
full rent created by the investment due to some ex-post bargaining power of the access-seeking
firm.
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if only ex-post contracts were allowed. Fig. 2 illustrates the investment behavior
of firms acting in markets with price-independent industry demand depending on
the particular contracting environment.
 insert Fig. 2 around here 
Consequently, we obtain the following results:
Result 3. If ex-ante contracts are feasible, then at least one firm invests more
frequently as under either only ex-post contracts or no contracting at all.
Result 4. With ex-ante contracts, duplication of investments occurs less often.
As already pointed out in our previous discussion of the implications of ex-post
contracts, we again come to the conclusion that the avoidance of duplication can
harm consumers. Consumers can, however, benefit from ex-ante contracts, pro-
vided these contracts make investments economically profitable in the first place.14
7 Implications for Regulation
This paper focuses on the allocative implications of diﬀerent contracting regimes.
Regulators (and courts) may discourage or even prohibit certain contracting regimes.
For instance, regulators may rule out cost-sharing contracts at an ex-ante stage–
i.e., they may eﬀectively prohibit ex-ante contracts. The allocative consequences
of such an intervention follow directly from the analysis above.
Regulators may also intervene and impose certain contractual clauses with
respect to access. In particular, they may impose particular access prices. Here
we shortly discuss the implications of our framework for access regulation. This
part of the analysis is less original, since previous work has looked at one-way
access regulation before (see the references in Section 2).
Here, our analysis suggests a standard potential conflict between the creation
of higher investment incentives and competition after the initial investment. For
14One aspect we have not yet covered in our model is the availability of a new technology in the
future that further intensifies competition. If access to the forerunner technology is essential to
using the newly available technology, this market exhibits the property of a ladder of investment–
i.e., investment in the current technology is spurred, as otherwise the future technology is not
available. In this case, ex-ante contracts have the disadvantage for the access-granting firm
that it, figuratively speaking, nurtures a future competitor to a certain extent. From a welfare
perspective, we therefore face the risk that even with ex-ante contracting the investing firm will
choose not to grant market access and, consequently, foreclosure will result.
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example, the retail prices of both firms would rise if a simple linear tariﬀ  was
increased (anticompetitive), while at the same time the investment incentives of
the access-granting firm would increase (investment enhancing).
While access regulation is a standard policy instrument, we note that also the
type of contract that is encouraged or discouraged is relevant: It is possible to
influence investment incentives as well as retail prices by either encouraging or
discouraging ex-ante (co-investment) contracts. On the one hand, as was previ-
ously shown, the signing of such contracts reduces the probability of duplicating
investments, and, therefore, intense price competition. On the other hand, the
probability that at least one of the firms invests increases.
Three welfare eﬀects have to be taken into consideration, when assessing the
impact of regulatory measures:
• the investment decision (and, thus, the quality of products oﬀered on the
market) and their impact on costs and consumer valuations,
• the allocation in the competitive segment (and, therefore, "transportation
costs" in the model), and
• the deadweight loss in the monopoly segment (if () is decreasing in –
i.e., industry demand depends on price).
Access at Marginal Costs The regulator can decide whether firm 1 provides
network access at marginal costs. If such a regulation is anticipated by the firms,
at most one firm will invest in the new technology, thus excluding duplication
of investment. As firm 1 has to cover the fixed costs itself, it will only invest if
 ≤ ∗(1 1). As ∗(1 0)  ∗(1 1), investments are less frequent than in a market
without network access.
With price-independent industry demand neither of the firms benefits from the
investment and, for every   0, none of the firms is willing to invest. We are,
therefore, in the paradoxical situation that each firm is better oﬀ if the regulator
announces a "tough" regulation scheme. As this deters firms from investing, profits
of ∗(0 0) arise. Without access regulation and under the assumption of suﬃciently
low investment costs, both firms would invest. Each firm then would make a profit
of ∗(1 1)−  . As ∗(1 1) = ∗(0 0) under price-independent industry demand,
firms are in fact better oﬀ under the regulated regime.
Fixed-Cost Redistribution If investments costs are redistributed via a fixed
payment, the above insight is still valid since higher investments lead to neither
higher price-costs diﬀerences nor increased sales. In case of price-elastic demand,
however, cost sharing increases investment incentives significantly. Such a rule
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could be a function of equilibrium sales ∗1 and ∗2. Suppose that firm 1 had
invested. Firm 2 may then have to make the fixed payment (∗2∗) to firm 1
in order to receive network access at the marginal costs 1 =  . With such an
access rule, both firms are indiﬀerent as to which one of them will actually make
the investment (presuming that the required investment cost is the same for both
of them). Of course, this cost-sharing rule does not typically lead to the first-best-
eﬃcient investment since firms are not able to extract the full additional rents
resulting from the investment.
Access subject to a Fixed Cost Surcharge One can, in addition, determine
a surcharge so that the access-seeking firm covers a part of the fixed costs that is
exactly proportional to the number of times it accesses the network–i.e., one can
determine a parameter  that satisfies (− )∗2 = (∗2∗). This is equivalent
to writing  =  + ∗. In this case, the price is clearly above marginal costs.
Thus, the investing firm accrues higher profits than in the case of marginal cost
based access, due to a direct and an indirect eﬀect. The direct eﬀect comes from
profits arising in the access business, where    . The indirect eﬀect of this
higher access charge is a reduction in the intensity of competition in the retail
sector. The reduction of competition is to the detriment of consumers, provided
that the higher charge does not raise investment incentives suﬃciently.
In our model, if both firms have the same eﬃciency in investing, the market
outcome is not aﬀected by the identity of the firm that invests. If there are
diﬀerences in investment eﬃciency, the more eﬃcient firm has a higher incentive to
invest. As an example, consider the government undertaking an access regulation.
If the government auctions a license to upgrade a network, the more eﬃcient firm
will acquire this license.
Access subject to a Variable Cost Surcharge The previously discussed sur-
charge had the property that investment costs are proportionally borne among
firms in equilibrium. This essentially requires to "predict" the equilibrium out-
come accurately. The regulator can, instead, choose an access surcharge that
is determined ex-post and that distributes costs according to the realized market
shares. Hence, to satisfy (−)2 = (2) it holds ex-post that  = +.
If industry demand is price-independent, we observe that the access charge is con-
stant.
On the contrary, if industry demand is price-dependent, firm 1 has now an in-
centive to reduce the number of own subscribers 1 so as to reduce its share of the
charges (cost sharing) . Reversely, firm 2 has an incentive to increase its number
of subscribers because this determines the reduction of the access surcharge. Reg-
ulation of this type secures a higher number of consumers for the access-seeking
19
firm in equilibrium relative to the case of a fixed cost surcharge. Thus, by im-
posing a variable cost surcharge, regulation leads to a larger market share for the
access-seeking firm. The eﬀects on consumer welfare  and aggregate welfare
 depend on the specific assumptions of the model and, therefore, do not yield
robust predictions.
Linear Access Markups If industry demand is price-independent, profits of
the investing firm are increasing in , while profits of the access-seeking firm
are independent of . Therefore, the higher the level of , the more likely is
the investment. Duplication of investments does not occur at all. If industry
demand is price-dependent, returns of the investing firm are still increasing in ,
but profits of the access-seeking firm decrease in . A higher access surcharge leads
to a reduction in the number of subscribers that the non-investing firm has in its
hinterland. Since accessing the market through a competitor is costly, the access-
seeking firm might find it, instead, more profitable to undertake an investment
on its own. Hence, a higher access markup increases its investment incentives
and, thus, the likelihood that network duplication will take place. However, if
the corresponding equilibrium profits, denoted by ∗(1 0;), do not cover the
investment costs, regulators must subsidize the investment in the NGA network
such that the subsidy covers ∗(1 0;) − ∗(0 0) minus the investment costs;
otherwise, no investment will take place.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the interplay of ex-ante and ex-post access contracts
as well as access regulation with competition and investment incentives. Within
a standard duopoly model, we have shown that ex-post access contracts lead less
often to a duplication of investments, but to a wider roll-out compared to a market
in which such contracts cannot be oﬀered. In comparison to such ex-post contracts,
ex-ante contracts lead to an even wider roll-out, but to a less frequent duplication of
investments. However, ex-ante contracts in particular, but also ex-post contracts,
can be used to dampen competition.
In the present work, we have generally taken the perspective that network op-
erators are ex-ante symmetric. In further work, we focus instead on asymmetries
between network operators, in particular in terms of the size of their "legacy net-
work" (see Inderst and Peitz, 2011a). In the present work, we have also abstracted
much from uncertainty, so as to streamline the exposition. Uncertainty is at the
focus of Inderst and Peitz (2011b), where we explore the impact of regulation when
there is large uncertainty about the market potential from new investments.
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Appendix 1: Supplementary material on competition and equilib-
rium
When taking the first-order conditions, we obtain firm 1’s best-response func-
tion:
1 =  b1 + 1
2
1 +  1
2
+
1
2
(1 − 2) + 1
2
2.
Correspondingly, for firm 2:
2 =  b2 + 1
2
2 +  1
2
+
1
2
(2 − 1) + 1
2
1.
As is well known in this type of models, the best-response function is increasing in
the competitor’s price. Thus, prices are strategic complements. The Nash equilib-
rium constitutes the intersection point of the best-response functions. Equilibrium
prices are:
∗1 = 231 +
1
3
2 +  4b1
3
+  2b2
3
+  + 1
3
(1 − 2)
∗2 = 232 +
1
3
1 +  4b2
3
+  2b1
3
+  + 1
3
(2 − 1)
The equilibrium price diﬀerence is:
∗2 − ∗1 = 23(2 − 1) +
1
3
(2 − 1) +  2
3
(b2 − b1)
This price diﬀerence is, ceteris paribus, higher (1) the larger the utility diﬀerence
of the two products, 2 − 1, (2) the greater the diﬀerence in costs, 2 − 1, and
(3) the larger the diﬀerence in the size of each firm’s hinterland, b2− b1 (i.e., the
captive consumers).
Equilibrium market shares in the competitive segment can be computed as
b∗ = 1
2
− 1
6 (2 − 1) +
1
6 (2 − 1) +
1
3
(b2 − b1)
Equilibrium profits are
∗1 =
µ
−11
¶
(∗1 − 1)2 = 12 (
∗
1 − 1)2
∗1 =
µ
−22
¶
(∗2 − 2)2 = 12 (
∗
2 − 2)2
Substituting for the values of equilibrium prices, we obtain the expressions for
equilibrium profits reported in the main text.
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Social welfare measured as total surplus (gross of investment costs) is given by
 = [(b+ b1)(1 − 1) + (1− b+ b2)(2 − 2)−  (b)] ,
in which transportation costs  (b) are defined as
 (b) = Z 
0
+
Z 1

(1− )
=
b2
2
+
(1− b)2
2
=

2
(1 + 2b2 − 2b)
Transportation costs are minimized when the indiﬀerent consumer b is located at
point 12. Welfare is maximized when

b = (1 − 1)− (2 − 2)− (2b− 1) = 0
Hence, the eﬃcient allocation is determined by
b = 1
2
+
(1 − 1)− (2 − 2)
2
=
1
2
− 2 − 1
2 +
2 − 1
2 
We can compare this allocation with the equilibrium allocation, denoted byb∗. In the case of perfect symmetry (1 = 2, 1 = 2, 1 = 2), the equilib-
rium allocation is eﬃcient. However, as is well known, asymmetries can lead to
ineﬃciency. This is due to the fact that when a firm has a larger market share, a
marginal price decrease is “more expensive”, since it must be applied to a larger
volume, leading to a larger negative eﬀect on profits. For instance, in equilibrium,
a more eﬃcient firm will exhibit a higher margin and will possess a larger, though
not suﬃciently large, market share. Alternatively, when 1 − 1 = 2 − 2, the
firm with the largest hinterland has an ineﬃciently low share of the competitive
segment. The reason is, again, that a firm with a larger hinterland acts less aggres-
sively in the competitive segment because, without diﬀerentiating the price over
the various segments, a price reduction is applied to a larger volume (b∗ +)
and is, ultimately, more expensive.
Appendix 2: Supplementary material on price-dependent industry
demand.
With symmetric hinterlands,  ≡ 1 = 2,  ≡ 1 = 2,  ≡ 1 = 2, we can
write firm ’s demand as a linear function of both prices
 =( −  + )
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in which
 = 1
2
+ +
µ
1
2 + 
¶
 − 1
2   6= 
 = 1
2 + 
 = 1
2 
The first-order conditions of the profit-maximization problem max( − )
lead to:
1 = 1 + 1 + 2
2 
2 = 2 + 2 + 1
2 
In equilibrium, firm 1’s price is determined by
∗1(42 − 2) = 2(1 + 1) + (2 + 2)
Therefore, the equilibrium price of firm 1 is:
∗1 = 2(1 + 1) + (2 + 2)42 − 2 
Similarly, for firm 2.
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Figure 1: Investments and ex-post contracting
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Figure 2: Investments and contracting
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